And yet there are many who claim that reasoned argument plays a central role in political life. Hamilton cast doubt on the efficacy of public reason, but he did so in the course of making an extended series of reasoned arguments in favor of the newly proposed constitution. More recently, radical disputes like those over abortion have attracted the attention of scholars who have insisted that even the most profound political divides can be bridged by reasoned argument (Cf. Guttmann and Thompson 1998) . When it comes to public reason, it would seem that there is cause for both hope and despair.
In this paper, we take up the question of public reason's role and reach an answer that is at once optimistic about the capacity for reasoned argument in politics and critical of such reasoning's weaknesses. More specifically, we submit that ambiguous and incompletely theorized arguments dominate the discussion of radical disputes and can be just as useful as a medium for resolving such disputes as "public reason." To illustrate this point, we select the same-sex marriage (SSM) dispute and demonstrate how an ambiguous and incompletely theorized set of arguments about national ideals, particularly the ideals of the American Dream, (i) characterize much of the debate over SSM, and (ii) offer the possibility of a language that can help bridge the divide between the contending parties to this dispute.
The paper proceeds in three parts. In Part I, we begin with John Rawls and his famous claim that the United States Supreme Court is the exemplar of public reason. We agree that the high bench provides a model of reasoned argument, but we disagree with Rawls about the kind of reasoned argument in which members of the Court engage. Drawing on the work of Charles Lindblom, Edward Levi, and Cass Sunstein, we argue that judicial reasoning is actually often piecemeal and ambiguous, without developed premises or well-specified conclusions. This fragmented, ambiguous reasoning employed by the Court may point beyond itself, promoting deliberation as actors attempt to work out the issues left unsettled in judicial opinions.
Such deliberation is a possibility, not an inevitability. We recognize that unfinished, ambiguous reasoning of Court decisions may not lead to fruitful discussion and substantive agreement. In that case, then the Court will have produced piecemeal decisions that do not point beyond themselves. Without stimulating further deliberation, ambiguous and incomplete judicial decisions are problematic: they can be seen as unpredictable (in the sense that judicial rulings do not logically vindicate pre-existing principles) and partial (in the sense that decisions remain limited to the shifting distribution of interests). In the absence of supplementary discussion and debate to refine and develop the terms of judicial decisions, the Court's muddled public reasoning will remain a muddle.
In concluding Part I, we ask if the Court's model of incompletely theorized reasoning extends beyond the judiciary and into the public domain. What would be necessary for ordinary citizens to pursue the promise and risk the pitfalls of judicial-style argumentation? We hypothesize that for this to occur, disputants in the public domain would have to engage in ambiguous, piecemeal, and partial forms of reasoning that everyone can live with. At minimum, ambiguous forms of reasoning thus require some baseline commonalities among disputants that provide the raw material for making fragmented arguments.
In Part II, we illustrate that even in heterogeneous polities divided by radical disputes, such baseline commonalities among disputants might be found. The American polity, for instance, routinely identifies itself as a nation of believers in the values of the American Dream (Citrin 1994; Hochschild 1995; Cullen 2003; Jillson 2004; Schildkraut 2007; Ghosh 2008) . Most Americans believe that those who work hard should succeed. In addition, they also believe that the quintessential feature of being American is to do better in life than some earlier stage. One of the core elements of the American Dream is the idea of a level playing field. Most Americans hold steadfastly to the belief that under conditions of equal opportunity an individual can go as far as their talents will take them (Hochschild 1995) . To be sure, the Dream is ambiguous and incompletely theorized, even to the point that it is extremely difficult to articulate an exact definition of the Dream. Yet the Dream persists among a diverse group of Americans as a shared set of national ideals.
Given that both radical disputes and a common set of bedrock values shared by most Americans exist, we raise the following question: Can the national values of Americans, as expressed in the American Dream, be a form of incompletely theorized reasoning that replaces "public reason" when parties are engaged in a radical dispute? That is, can shared ideals, even if they are ambiguous and incompletely theorized, offer a language or a medium that enables parties to a radical dispute to talk to each other? In order to examine this, we turn to the case of a real-world radical dispute: same-sex marriage.
In Part III we examine the oft-cited dispute over SSM and argue that it is indeed a radical one, with the contending parties separated by very different views about the meaning and value of sexuality and family. To be sure, SSM is not the only radical dispute in contemporary American political life. Yet, for our purposes, we are interested in examining the extent to which the shared set of values of the American Dream might inform this particular dispute.
We find that on both sides of the dispute parties formulate arguments about SSM in terms of the American Dream. These arguments are often incomplete and ambiguous. We submit that the partial, unfinished nature of the American Dream arguments offers a vocabulary for the parties to this dispute to communicate with each other and proceed toward some resolution of the conflict that coheres with the American Dream values they cherish. But we also warn that the shared use of American Dream does not in and of itself bring disputants any closer to reasoned consensus. Without joint deliberation that seeks to agree on a single, more complete understanding of the American Dream, the joint invocations of the same ambiguous claims simply provide a means by which partisans may continue to talk past one another.
Unfortunately, it is precisely this kind of incomplete and ambiguous reasoning without consensus that has permeated the contemporary debate over SSM to date. We conclude by briefly considering what might help move this debate toward deeper agreement.
PART I

Public Reasoning as Judicial Reasoning
The most exhaustive account of public reason as the mechanism for resolving radical disputes is John Rawls's Political Liberalism (Rawls 2005) . The use of public reason, according to Rawls, will lead to an "overlapping consensus" that will trump all sorts of conflicts involving reasonable comprehensive doctrines held by disparate communities. This consensus stems from a "freestanding political conception of justice" which is itself not reducible to any one of the comprehensive conceptions in the polity. Rawls famously identified the United States Supreme Court as the central, functioning source of reasoned argument in American politics. 2 2 Other theorists have subsequently extended the idea of public reason. For instance, Macedo argues, "The demand for public reasonableness is especially important where fundamental rights and liberties are at stake, and in the face of a long history of arbitrary and invidious forms of discrimination. Here the modern Supreme Court has rightly insisted that before the government can infringe fundamental rights, or before it can subject a 'discrete and insular minority' to unequal treatment, a high burden of reasoned justification must be met" (Macedo 1997 ). Gutmann and Thompson point out that reasoned resolutions are possible through democratic deliberation if certain moral principles -such as reciprocity, fair opportunity, publicity, and accountability -apply to both the process and substance of democratic decision-making For Rawls, the Court, by virtue of its principled working out of higher law, is the exemplar of public reason. The members of the Court do not always agree as they reason; nor do they always do a good job of reasoning in every case. Yet public reason is what the Court does.
Indeed, according to Rawls, public reasoning is the only kind of reasoning the Court can legitimately do and it forms the basis of the Court's authority. The Court is, Rawls writes, "the only branch of government that is visibly on its face a creature of [public] reason and of that reason alone" (235). It is "the task of the justices to try to develop and express in their opinions the best interpretation of the constitution they can, using their knowledge of what the constitution and constitutional precedents require" (236). In carrying out this task, the justices must "justify by public reason why they vote as they do" as well as "make their grounds consistent and fit them into a coherent constitutional view over the whole range of their decisions" (235).
We follow Rawls and treat the Court as enacting a model of public reason. The Court occupies a unique position in our politics: it strives to reason about the most controversial issues in our society in terms that are not reducible to the ideology of any one party or group. The Court takes up political questions but does not give them partisan answers. In important respects, the Court supplies the central template for how to reason about conflict in ways that are responsive to the values which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse.
We do not follow Rawls, however, in our understanding of how the Court reasons.
Rawls emphasizes the judicial duty to craft "the best interpretation of the constitution" and, in doing so, Rawls seems to suggest that the justices will produce fully articulated judicial (Gutmann and Thompson 1998; Cf. Fish 1997b) . Deliberative democracy is also expected to give rise to free political discussion, open legislative deliberations, and a pursuit of common good (Freeman 2000) . Although it has no monopoly over reason, deliberative politics emphasizes applying cognitive judgment, and therefore cognitive reason, to moral and political questions (Estlund 1993) .
arguments that move from well-developed premises to well-considered conclusions.
3 In his emphasis on principled argument, Rawls echoes the conventional understanding of judicial action. According to the conventional view, judicial decisionmaking is meant to be rooted in the clear articulation and neutral application of general principles (Peretti 1999:11-35) . 4 Jurists may disagree about the origin and content of these general principles. In whatever way they are understood, however, the principles are taken to be of primary importance. Judges should strive to assimilate each dispute into a principled order, articulating a framework of rules and standards capable of regulating subsequent judicial decisions (Wasserstrom 1961:14-22) . In the ideal case, the principled legal order makes judicial action perfectly reasoned and predictable: every legal outcome is reached by the logical application of pre-existing rules and standards to each new fact situation. Moreover, within such an ideal system the exercise of judicial power is restrained and impartial: court decisions do not depend on the private whim or bias of the judge presiding over the case, but on a publicly known set of legal principles.
5
We take a different approach. (Maveety 1996) . Instead of adhering to a comprehensive jurisprudential theory or overarching constitutional vision, she tended to fashion her opinions around limited cores of agreement, blurring hard-edged principles for the sake of limited solutions. O'Connor moved from decision to decision pursuing small-scale settlements rather than seeking sweeping conclusions.
O'Connor is not the only justice in the history of the Supreme Court who might be described as following a path of piecemeal argumentation (Jeffries 1994) . And the practice of such argumentation goes well beyond individual justices. Although it is not true of all judicial opinions, it is the case that many judicial opinions appear to be fragmented, ramshackle affairs cobbled together to dispose of the case at hand. Indeed, judicial decisions often look less like exemplars of careful justification rather than like the choices a person makes when picking out a midnight snack from whatever looks good in the refrigerator (Carter 1985:22) .
Why would judges reason in such a fragmented and incomplete way? The political scientist Charles Lindblom suggested an answer nearly fifty years ago (Lindblom 1988a According to Lindblom, policymaking decisions do not flow strictly from the logical application of pre-existing principles -a result that falls far short of meeting the expectations for principled reasoning that are shared by Rawls and the conventional understanding of judicial decisionmaking. The problem here is, as Lindblom suggests, with the expectation that principled reasoning will always be performed. 6 Policymakers for the most part cannot deal with uncertain, conflict-laden issues except by muddling through them, regardless of what others might expect policymakers to do.
6 As Lindblom wrote twenty years after the publication of his original article, "I have never understood why incrementalism in its various forms has come to so prominent place in the policy making literature. [My original] article has been reprinted in roughly forty anthologies. I always thought that, although some purpose was served by clarifying incremental strategies of policy analysis and policy making, to do so was only to add a touch of articulation and organization to ideas already in wide circulation. Nor have I well understood the frequency with which incremental analysis as a norm is resisted. That complex problems cannot be completely analyzed and that we therefore require strategies for skillful incompleteness still seem close to obvious to me" (Lindblom 1988b: 257) .
In this vein, one could argue that piecemeal judicial opinions are often the only effective kind of judicial decisions possible under conditions of disagreement and limited information.
Members of the bench may try to ignore such political limits and, in doing so, they may consistently strive to apply general principles to concrete controversies. But decisions that ignore political context are unlikely to be actual successes (Rosenberg 1991) . If judges want to be (and understand how to be) effective, they will see that judicial action is bound up with political circumstance. When the political context is fragmented and in flux, the conventional ideal of principled judicial decisionmaking will be put aside for the sake of acceptable settlements, as the practical task of resolving disputes crowds out the aspiration for carefully reasoned legal judgment. As Edward Levi once put it, "The pretense is that the law is a system of known rules applied by a judge.… [Yet in] an important sense legal rules are never clear, and if a rule had to be clear before it could be imposed, society would be impossible" (Levi 1949: 1) .
If one considers judicial action as an exercise in the logical application of general principles to specific controversies, then any judicial process that proceeds from one ambiguous decision to another is a disaster. But, as we have suggested, there are reasons to believe that consistency and completeness are not the standards against which the judicial process should be measured in the first place. Although it may lack logical elegance and rigor, a legal system in which the rules are incomplete and in flux is "the only kind of system which will work when people do not agree completely" (Levi 1949: 104) .
Indeed, the case for incomplete reasoning by judges may be strongest at the level of the Supreme Court -the very institution that Rawls deemed the principal exemplar of public reason.
As Cass Sunstein notes, the issues before the Court are often deeply controversial, with no clear consensus on how to proceed and contradictory information on the consequences of alternative approaches. Mired in disagreement and uncertainty, members of the Court may find it difficult to reach consensus on comprehensive conclusions. Even if judicial consensus can be achieved, sweeping decisions may be nothing more than stabs in the dark that yield unintended and unfortunate consequences. The high cost of reaching broad agreement, coupled with the risk of making blunders, leads members of the Court to incremental rulings -a practice Sunstein calls "decisional minimalism" (Sunstein 1999: 4 ; see also Sunstein 1996) . Hobbled by conflict and poor information, the minimalist justices choose to forego the forced resolution of fundamental issues and to settle instead for agreement on a few particulars. Judicial minimalism is valuable, Sunstein argues, because it facilitates political accommodation on the Court in times of conflict and uncertainty. Instead of seeking broad settlements, the minimalist members of the Court "ask that decisions be narrow rather than wide. They decide the case at hand; they do not decide other cases too, except to the extent that one decision bears on other cases, unless they are pretty much forced to do so" (Sunstein 1999 :10, emphasis original). Moreover, minimalist justices "generally try to avoid issues of basic principle. They want to allow people who disagree on the deepest issues to converge. In this way they attempt to reach incompletely theorized agreements" (Sunstein 1999:11, emphasis original) . Minimalists thus serve the "great goal" of a free society, "making agreement possible when agreement is necessary, and making agreement unnecessary when it is impossible" (Sunstein 1999:50) .
As Sunstein argues, incomplete judicial decisions are not only a result of the Court's adaptation to conditions of uncertainty and conflict, but also a potential means for creating the ground on which uncertainty and conflict may be overcome. Political actors may accept narrow, thinly justified judicial decisions because such decisions create a flexible framework in which political argument can continue to unfold (Henderson 2007 The above-described sequence will unfold, of course, only if piecemeal decisions actually do in fact stimulate deliberation. Without deliberation developing and refining the terms of ambiguous judicial decisions, these decisions remain localized responses to specific conditions of disagreement, merely temporary settlements dependent on the parties in the case and the justices on the bench. Such results may pacify disputants in the short term -and this may be all the Court can do under the circumstance that it operates. Yet without deliberation, judicial decisions will not lead to the development of principled agreement capable of producing lasting resolutions of conflicts. Reasoning will be on display, but no consensus will be produced.
For the purposes of this paper, however, we are less interested in the Court's reasoning in and of itself. Instead, our goal is to consider whether the Court's model of incompletely theorized reasoning extends into the public domain of democratic deliberation. A court may allow parties with deep differences to converge by issuing narrow, incremental decisions that everyone can live with: "making agreement possible when agreement is necessary, and making agreement unnecessary when it is impossible." For such a form of dispute management to work in the public domain, disputants need to agree wherever possible (such as in the case of commonly held ideals and values) and implicitly refrain from addressing those issues where agreement seems impossible (such as, ideals and values that are group-specific). Thus, disputants have to agree to a set of baseline values that each of them can and does adhere to, even though they are aware of their disagreements with other parties about values and ideals that are specific to their group. Such an agreement would necessarily be limited and amorphous, unlike Rawls's elaborately worked-out "principles of justice." In addition, they would be expressed in incomplete, messy, and not fully-reasoned terms. Such agreements would also coexist with conflict about larger differences, which are cold-bloodedly bracketed out in the case of a Rawlsian public reason.
The conditions necessary for the use of incomplete and ambiguous reasoning by the public prevail in contemporary America. That is, there is in the American polity a common set of values and a set of radical disputes that defy the methods and rules of textbook public reasoning. In Part II below, we begin with a discussion of the "American Dream" -a set of highly flexible ideals that "make agreement possible" because they are shared by a majority of Americans. We extend the discussion in Part III, where we examine the SSM debate and consider the ramifications of appealing to the American Dream in radical disputes like SSM.
PART II
Americans constitute a community of people who share the same ideals about American political culture (Huntington 1981) . They have always "imagined" (the term is Benedict Andersen's [1983] ) themselves as a community, not in terms of race, ethnicity, language, religion (although at various points, these elements of national identity have been important for some groups in the U.S.) but, instead, in terms of a "civil religion" (Bellah 1967; Wilcox and Larso 2006; Fowler et al 2004) . Bellah (1967) has clarified the concept of civil religion by pointing out how religion is always a background condition in American public life. It ties the nation to a higher purpose that echoes John Winthrop's call to create a "city upon a hill" in America, 8 "a promised land," an "American Israel," a "beacon of hope" for the rest of the world, where everyone is free -in general -but particularly free to pursue the religion of their choice.
In this sense the national purpose is divine, although it is not associated with any particular form of divinity, institutionalized religion, or even any given, specific, God. For Bellah, this
American civil religion derives from the "words and acts of the founding fathers" and is expressed in a "set of beliefs, symbols, and rituals" that symbolize the "religious dimension for the whole fabric of American life" (Bellah 1967 ).
Thus, a set of values characterize American national identity. This set of values are best represented in the contemporary notion of the American Dream which encompasses individualism, equal opportunity, and the idea of "success" (Hochschild 1995; Cullen 2003; Jillson 2004; Ghosh 2008) . Schildkraut (2007) has discovered that a "broad range of constitutive norms define being American" thus confirming that "multiple traditions" (Smith 1997 ) inform
American national identity. She thereby documents an account of American national identity that counters other studies that point out the pervasive influence of liberalism in the U.S. (Citrin et al 1994; Feldman 1988; Lipset 1963; McClosky and Zaller 1984 and black Americans believe that hard work will lead to success and that people should strive hard to get ahead" (Citrin et al. 1994: 14) . Belief in the ideal that hard work will lead to success is pervasive in America. It traces its roots back to the founding values of the nation (Ghosh 2008) , in the Puritan injunction to work hard and dedicate oneself to one's "calling" (Weber 2002; Tawney 1926; Poggi 1983; Morgan 1965; Marshall 1982; Dunn 1969) .
Diverse accounts of the Dream exist (Adams 1931; Tebbel 1963; Nackenoff 1994; Hochschild 1995; Cullen 2003; Jillson 2004 ) but few offer a comprehensive disambiguation of this incompletely theorized concept. One definition of the Dream is:
Ceteris paribus, the American Dream is the belief or hope that in America every individual possesses (or ought to possess) an equal opportunity to succeed in life, regardless of how she defines success for herself. (Ghosh 2008) This definition captures the "deep structures" (Frohock 1978) Consider some of the multiple interpretations that may be given to each of these elements: Individualism ranges from atomistic to moral individualism to individuality, which emphasizes autonomy and creativity; belief in equal opportunity implies the affirmation of both level starting points and equal outcomes; success, too, is open to plural interpretations including but not limited to material success, celebrity status, and even living in the suburbs. In addition, success can be private or public, in the sense that when political leaders speak of success they might refer to the success of the individual (as in, say, upward mobility or immigration) or they might choose to refer to the success of the collective (as in, say, widespread opportunities, suburban bliss, abundance, and so on) (Ghosh 2008 ).
These ambiguities make the Dream sufficiently flexible for a wide variety of groups to find the Dream attractive because they supply each group something they can find appealing about the Dream although they might reject competing interpretations of the Dream. Thus, the American Dream provides some baseline commonality of ideals that most Americans share.
For our purposes, we are interested in finding out the following: When it comes to management of radical disputes, does adherence to the ideals of the American Dream translate into "making agreement possible when agreement is necessary, and making agreement unnecessary when it is impossible"? That is, do parties to a radical dispute actually frame their arguments by drawing from this shared set of values that everyone can, and wants to, live with?
If this is the case, then we can conclude that there is some hope of dispute management -even in radical settings -that uses a shared set of incomplete and partially theorized set of ideals as a shared language to frame arguments. In order to examine whether this is what, in fact, goes on in the real world of radial disputes, we now turn in Part III to our case study: the SSM debate that has polarized the American electorate in recent years.
Part III
The Same-Sex Marriage Debate as a Radical Dispute
Radical disputes are disputes among constituencies divided by deep differences that relate to their comprehensive beliefs about their sense of self and their purpose in this world (Luker 1984) . Typically, such deep differences are animated by constituencies' religious beliefs (Frohock 2006; Owen 2001; Fish 1997a; 1997b) . What makes these differences deep is the seemingly non-negotiable nature of the core beliefs of the contending parties. Examples of these deep differences include belief in the practices of animal sacrifice in religious ceremonies, veiling, female genital mutilation, and abortion. Giving up on such practices constitutes, for these parties, giving up an important sense of their self and, therefore, a major loss of their The disagreement over SSM is deeper than the polls numbers suggest. There is the sort of moral outrage (Morone 2003: 4) in the debate that has marked "clash of cultural values" disputes throughout American history. Anti-SSM advocates argue that SSM will lead to society's ruination, while pro-SSM advocates argue that denying SSM is a constitution-killing civil rights violation. In other words, the SSM debate has traits of a radical dispute.
More specifically, one can say that the SSM debate is a radical dispute because in it disputants start from entirely different premises about the meaning and purpose of marriage, sexuality, and family. Consider, first, the views of the opponents of SSM. Gerstmann has pointed out that there are four general categories of reasons that deny SSM: definition, tradition, and religion; natural law; the equation of marriage with procreation and child rearing; and moral disapproval of homosexuality and the question of government endorsement (2008: 21-47; Cf.
Cohen 2004)
. 9 For some of these opponents of SSM, the definition of marriage is entirely nonnegotiable. It is necessarily an institution that represents a union between a man and a woman.
According to some, particularly those who draw from natural law theory, this union represents two lives that are conjoined around the biological function of reproduction, friendship, and a sense of community between a man and a woman (Finnis 1994; Lee and George 1997) .
Without an insistence on such a reproduction-oriented view of marriage, these groups are unable to make sense of what marriage could possibly mean. Others view SSM as an assault on the traditional family structure. They are appalled at the suggestion that what they view as aberrant sexual behavior might be given recognition and legitimacy through a radically new and inclusive 9 Sean Cahill, Director of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Policy Institute, has usefully compiled the following list of arguments proposed against SSM: allowing gay couples to marry will damage or destroy the institution of marriage; gay relationships are unhealthy; gay relationships are unsafe; because gay people and their relationships are unhealthy and destructive they are a drain on the economy; gay parenting is a looming threat that endangers children and society; gay parents are more likely to abuse their children; gay men are more likely to be pedophiles; gay marriage is a threat to religious freedom: religions will be forced to recognize and sanction gay unions; gay rights advances are akin to terrorism; SSM signals the breakdown of society and is part of a satanic plot to destroy civilization; gay couples do not need the legal protections of marriage; gay people already get married; gays seek to legalize polygamy or group marriage; gay marriage threatens accepted gender roles and will lead to a decline in the population (Cahill 2004: 26-42) . Denying the legitimacy of the anti-SSM arguments, some advocates of SSM argue that marriage is a right to a contract that should be granted to all mutually consenting couples. Others argue that it is more than a right, and that is a celebration of same-sex couples' love and commitment for one another and social and cultural recognition (Pinello 2006; Hull 2006 ). On such a view, a denial of the right to marry to any two individuals who are in love, and are committed to being with each other for their entire lives, is incomprehensible.
Pro-SSM activists avoid stipulating the gender identity of the parties to a marriage contract and refrain from talking about the biological function of reproduction as essential to marriage. For them, marriage is a not necessarily a union between a man and a woman. Against the reproduction and "biological unity" view of marriage, proponents of SSM argue that this narrow, tenuous claim is insupportable because a range of marriages do not admit of the possibility of reproduction for a variety of reasons including physical barriers between partners (such as in the case of marriages where one contracting party is in prison), or incapacity (as in the case of older couples who are incapable of being sexually active), or even infertility (cases where one of the partners to a marriage is infertile).
Furthermore, given their core beliefs about the meaning and purpose of marriage, some of these advocates are entirely unable to see why reproduction and heterosexual, procreative acts should be an essential component of marriage. In addition, these advocates of SSM do not adhere to the "tradition" argument against SSM and claim that just because something has been a tradition does not mean it is also legitimate. For them, even if marriage has been exclusionary in the past, there is no reason for it to remain so in the future.
Thus, there are deep differences between proponents and opponents of SSM about the meaning of marriage, sexuality, and family. Given these deep differences, it is not surprising to find that they often talk past one another and do not use the language of public reason that is celebrated in Rawls in order to arrive at a resolution of the conflict. In other words, these disputants do not behave "reasonably" with respect each other. They assume their respective positions to be so fundamentally different that resolution appears to be impossible. Under these circumstances, the only way out of the impasse, for most, seems to reside in coming up with some way to stamp out the antagonistic party's beliefs by fiat. Thus, as far as their understanding of the meaning and purpose of marriage is concerned, each side views its position as non-negotiable. Under such circumstances, democratic deliberation and public reason is unlikely to yield resolutions to the conflict as "overlapping consensus" is the last thing one expects to find among these radical disputants. Oddly, therefore, public reason fails exactly where it is most necessary.
Is there another form of reasoning, even if it is partial and incomplete, that might serve as a medium to arrive at resolutions that parties to this dispute can live with? As pointed out above, this will require some baseline agreement among contending parties with regard to certain ideals, such as those of the American Dream. Given the fact of a broad consensus about the American Dream, we are interested in examining here how this consensus might inform the radical SSM debate, and whether or not any possibility of resolution might exist in that sphere of ambiguous reasoning.
Same-Sex Marriage Disputants and the Ideals of the American Dream
Our research indicates that both parties to the dispute rely on tenets of the American (Strasser 2004; Chauncey 2004; Eskridge 2002; Goldberg-Hiller 2002; Bonauto 2003) . This view is reaffirmed in the Goodridge decision which cites the creation of "second class citizens" in reaching its conclusions. The court held that the Massachusetts Constitution "affirms the dignity and equality of all individuals," and "forbids the creation of second-class citizens." Thus, Bonauto (2003) has contended that ending the exclusion of gay and lesbian couples from civil marriage would honor the letter and spirit of Constitution. Additionally, as with other civil rights movements, it would acknowledge that gay and lesbian people and families already are part of the civil community.
Within this trope of social and political inclusion, there are two broad genres of arguments within the pro-SSM position that draw from the American Dream. The first relies upon an abstract individualism while the other builds on a group-specific point of view. The first set of arguments proposes that the opportunity to marry should be granted to all members of the political community regardless of their color, creed, sexual orientation, gender identity, religion, or socioeconomic class. These proponents of SSM who rely on abstract individualism assume the position that every individual should have an opportunity to marry whoever they wish to as long as the partner concerned is a consenting adult. On this view, SSM is taken not simply as a right but also, and perhaps more importantly, as an opportunity to lead a life marked by recognition and respect that heterosexuals enjoy as a matter of fact (Pinello 2006; Eskridge 2002 ). The question here turns not so much on the issue of having a right but instead on having access to marriage. This argument is analogous to Judith Shklar's (1991) thesis on the inclusion of African-Americans within American society in which she points out that the rights to work and vote are essential for political and social inclusion and, therefore, anyone deprived of these rights are essentially deprived of full citizenship in America including social and cultural recognition (Hull 2006). When LGBTs are denied the right to marry, the argument proceeds, they are denied access to full citizenship in a manner that runs counter to the promise of the American Dream. The Dream promises that opportunities for success should be equally available for anyone regardless of her identity. It further stipulates that an individual is allowed to define success for herself (Hochschild 1995) . Therefore, if a member of the LGBT community sees herself as successful only in a marital relationship, denying that individual this opportunity is tantamount to denying her a shot at her American Dream.
The second genre of arguments in favor of SSM considers it to be a group-specific right that has been historically denied to LGBT people. These proponents of SSM who view it as a group-specific right also draw their rhetoric from the American Dream of social justice and inclusion. They argue that, as a group, LGBTs have been historically denied the opportunity to marry. This denial runs counter to the American Dream's promise of equal opportunity for all.
Just as African-Americans were denied full inclusion in mainstream American society by a system of formal segregation, which denied equal opportunity, LGBTs are also excluded from mainstream American society by being denied an equal opportunity to marry. Gay rights activists say it's a matter of equality: They suggest that homosexuals should have the same rights and protections as heterosexuals… Others, though, say special rights shouldn't be granted on the basis of behavior -particularly one that many Americans find offensive. And some say that current laws are adequate to protect all Americans, regardless of their sexual orientation. (Public Agenda 2008) The entire discourse on special rights in relation to SSM is predicated on the tacit assumption that special rights are somehow inherently wrong. Here is the structure of the argument: "SSM is a special right. Therefore, SSM should be prohibited." But this is not a valid argument unless we also accept that special rights are bad for America. It is this latter, enthymematic premise of the argument that special rights are bad for America that draws from the American Dream's explicit commitment to a level playing field, in which any special rights, preferences, or privileges are intolerable.
Each side of the SSM dispute thus invokes its own version of the American Dream and they do so while each seemingly referring to the same ideals. For proponents of SSM, the only way a level playing field can be guaranteed is by making marriage inclusive. Thus exclusion from marriage counts as a systematic marginalization of the LGBT community, just as segregation laws and the institution of "separate but equal" facilities systematically marginalized 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed the role of public reason in American politics. We began by invoking Rawls's exemplar of public reason, the Supreme Court, and discussed how the high bench deploys ambiguous, incompletely theorized arguments as it adjudicates radical disputes. We then hypothesized that this same kind of reasoning might be possible in the public domain where ordinary citizens can rely on a shared yet flexible set of ideals to articulate claims in the context of deep disagreement. We argued that the American Dream supplies such a set of shared, highly flexible ideals. In the final section of this paper we focused on how participants in the real-world radical dispute over SSM rely on ambiguous, incomplete appeals to the American Dream that mirror the sort of incompletely theorized forms of reasoning used by Supreme Court justices.
Our analysis has led us to a conclusion that is both optimistic and critical of such reasoning's power. We have demonstrated how a movement toward a common understanding of a level playing field in marriage might bring SSM disputants closer to agreement. But we have also pointed out that so far SSM disputants have refrained from offering such a common understanding of the American Dream. Thus, although public reasoning (as we understand it), particularly with regard to the American Dream, has the potential to generate some form of consensus and agreement, we also find that it is not inevitable that this occurs. Parties to the SSM dispute may continue to invoke the ideals of the American Dream in making their arguments, without articulating a common understanding of what the Dream entails. They can, thereby, sustain the dispute by continuing to talk past one another strenuously reasoning on the basis of shared ideals without getting any closer to substantive agreement.
